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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ANGELA ALVARADO, an Infant,
by Hortence Alvarado, Her Guardian Ad Litem,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.-

Civil
No. 8043

RONALD TUCKER and HAROLD
N. TUCKER,
Defendants and Respondents.

Respondents' Brief
STATEMENT OF '11 HE CASE
Plaintiff has appealed from a directed verdict rendered follo\ving the conclusion of Plaintiff's evidence at
the trial of the above rna tter in the District ·court of
Weber County, State of Utah. The action was originally
commenced by the Plaintiff minor to recover injuries
alleged to have been sustained as a result of the negligence of the Defendants. By their Answer, Defendants
denied negligence on their part and in turn alleged that
the Plaintiff minor was guilty of negligence proximately
contributing to cause her own injuries.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
rrhe accident, 'vith respect to which this case was
filed, occurred on the 17th day of March, 1952, at about
() :30 o'clock p.m. The Defendant Ronald Tucker was
proceeding in a southerly direction on Eccles Avenue
between 22nd and 23rd Streets in Ogden, Utah, when the
Plai11tiff minor, Angela Alvarado, suddenly left the sidewalk on the east side of Eccles Avenue and ran out into
the street, behind an automobile approaching the automobile being operated by the Defendant Ronald Tucker,
and in such a way as to come suddenly in front of the
Defendants' car, being struck on the left front part of
the vehicle (Tr. 15, 16). At that time, the Defendant
Ronald Tucker was operating his father's automobile;
and because he 'vas a minor under the age of 18 years,
liability 'vas also claimed against the Defendant Harold
N. Tucker.
With the Plaintiff minor, at the time of the accident,
were several playmates, including Plaintiff's brother (Tr.
8, 13, 14). Plaintiff was then of the age of 11 years and
was attending the 4th grade in school (Tr. 7). She lived
on the east side of the street, on the corner of Eccles Ave.
and 22nd Street (Tr. 8, 13). Prior to the accident, she
and four other children 'vere playing tag, running up
and down the sidewalk on the east side of the street and
sometimes running across the street to the west side (Tr.
13, 14). Just before the collision occurred, Angela's
brother was chasing Angela and her girl friend, Karen
Norton (Tr. 14) . .As they ran along the sidewalk they
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started out into the street, at which time they sa\v a car
proceeding from the south to the north, so that they
hesitated, ran along the side of the car bet\veen it and
the curb, and then as the car 'vent by proceeded to run
out into the street again to cross over to the west side
in order to avoid Angela's brother (Tr. 15, 16). Angela
did not look to see if there were any cars coming from
the other direction. She was running as fast as she could
to get away from her brother (Tr. 16). Karen was
slightly ahead and therefore got farther across before
the automobile struck the Plaintiff (Tr. 16). She was
merely touched by the side of the car and not hurt (Tr.
24). Plaintiff never did see l\1r. Tucker's automobile nor
hear any brakes or any sound before she was struck (Tr.
18). Plaintiff's mother had told her several times not
to play in the street and Plaintiff testified she knew she
should not play out in the street ( Tr. 13). Her teacher
in school had also instructed her a bout not playing in
the street (Tr. 17).
The driver of the approaching car was not called
as a "ritness, but two people in the neighborhood were
called by the Plaintiff to testify with respect to what
they heard and sa"r· William Glen Norton, who lived at
2268 Eccles A venue (on the east side. of the street), was
fixing a light on his porch at a bout 6 :30 in the evening
of March 17, 1952, when the accident occurred. He heard
a screech of brakes and turned to see his little sister
( l{aren) pushed off the side of the car ( Tr. 24). He ran
out into the street and sa"7" that Angela was lying in
front of the ear, about 10 to 15 feet a\Yay from it (Tr.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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23). Prior to the sereeching of the brakes, he had heard
the ehildren s<-reaming, playing in the street (Tr. 26).
rrhe \\~itness did not see the impact, nor did he see any
tire skid marks on the street on the evening of the accident ( rrr. 26, 27). rrhe next day he went out and saw
some skid marks in the street but he could not tell
whether they were in the same location where the accident took place or not (Tr. 27).
Dorothy W ar<lleigh testified that she resided in
Ogden and '"as visiting at the 11acFarland residence, at
:2273 Eccles .A. Yenue, \Vhen the accident occurred. It was
bet,veen 6 :30 and 6 :45 and was dark outside ( Tr. 34).
~he heard a sereech of brakes and turned and looked out
of the windo'Y and sa'v ear lights over the end of her car
that was parked out in front. It looked, to the witness,
as if the car \\Tas going to strike her car and then she
sa\\'" it hit an object ,,,.hich was thro,vn into the air. She
immediately ran out and saw a little girl lying in the
street in front of the Tucker automobile (Tr. 33}. She
later testified that she \vas outside when she heard the
screeching of brakes (Tr. 34). She also testified that
she saw no skid marks that evening, but the next day
remembered seeing some skid marks in the street (Tr.
36, 37).
Mr. A. J. MacFarland testified that he resided at
2273 Eccles Ave. in Ogden and \vas 65 years of age; that
the day following the accident he went out and saw some
skid marks on the street and stepped them off down the
street and "that was about 17 steps. Seventeen good
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steps of skid marks, that is what I sa'v when I went out
into the street the next day.'' He further estimated that
would be about 50 feet (Tr. 43). He never took any actual
measurements and the skid marks consisted of two lines
(Tr. 44).
Although the Police Offieers who investigated the
accident at the scene shortly after it happened \vere not
called as "ritnesses, the Plaintiff did call LeRoy G. Bennett, a Sgt. on the Ogden Police Force, to testify with
respect to the brake marks described by the \vitness,
J\!IacFarland. The Officer testified that the speed limit
on Eccles Avenue was 25 miles per hour (Tr. 65). On
the basis of 80% coefficient of friction for the highway
and assuming that the vehicle had laid down 50 feet of
brake marks for each of the four wheels of the automobile, the Sgt. testified that the car \vould have been
traveling at a speed of approximately 35 miles per hour.
However, on cross examination he admitted that if the
entire overall distance of brake marks was 50 feet each
wheel would probably have traveled approximately 40
feet (giving allowance for the difference between the
front and the rear wheels of a normal automobile). Thus
assuming a coefficient of friction of 65% which would
be possible in the instant street the Sgt. testified that
the speed of the Yehicle would be between 25 and 30 miles
per hour (1.,r. 66).
l\Irs. Alvarado testified that she had not been at
home until about 6 :00; that she had allowed Angela to
go out to play after dark on the evening in question. She
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tPHtified that Angela was a sensible girl, ''She knows
\\'hat dangers there are in getting out in the street";
that she \\'as smart enough in school and got good marks.
She testified that she had told Angela not to go out into
the street and that Ang-(~la seemed to understand that
she \vas not to leave the sidewalk and go into the street
(Tr. 76). The witness further testified that she knew
that her children on occasion played in the street, that
\\'as \vhy she told Angelo not to do so.
The foregoing constitutes all of the testimony submitted by the Plaintiff in connection with the accident
and upon which it \\·as sought to establish liability of
the Defendants. At the conclusion of Plaintiff's testimony Defendants made a motion for directed verdict
\vhich was granted by the Court. The motion for directed
verdict was stated by counsel to be on the following
grounds:
'' 1. That as a matter of la\v the Plaintiffs have
failed to show that the Defendants, or either of them,
was negligent in any respect proximately causing the
injuries to the Plaintiff minor.
"2. That the evidence shows as a matter of law
that the Plaintiff minor was guilty of negligence proximately causing the injuries which she sustained and
therefore cannot recover.''
In granting Defendant's Motion, the Court stated:
''In this case the Defense has moved for a·
directed verdict on the basis of the evidence that
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is in. N o,Y, the evidence, the undeniable evidence,
is that-the uncontradicted evidence is that it was
dark. The children were playing on the sidewalk.
There is no evidence that the driver could have
seen the children outside of his headlights, whether
they v.rere high or low. The child ran from one
automobile, around directly from back of that
other automobile. On the basis of that the Court
will direct that the Jury retire, elect a foreman
and bring back a verdict of no cause of action.''
STATEMENT OF POINTS
It would thus appear, as stated by Appellant, that
the Court granted Defendants' Motion on both grounds
and, therefore, .that the issues before the Supreme Court
are:
1. Whether as a matter of law the evidence fails
to show negligence on the part of the Defendant proximately causing the accident.
2. Whether the evidence shows as a matter of law
that the Appellant was negligent proximately contributing to cause her own injuries.
If either of the foregoing propositions is supported
by the evidence, then the judgment of the trial court
should be affirmed. Respondents will proceed to discuss
the foregoing points in the order indicated and as set
forth in .1\ppellant's Brief.
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ARGUMENrl:
I

AS .L\ MATTER OF LAW THE EVIDENCE
F.,AILS rro SHOW RESPONDENTS WERE NEGLIG-ENT WHICH l)ROXII\1ATELY CAUSED PLAINTI~-.,F'8 INJURIES.
The burden is upon the Plaintiff to establish the
negligence of the Defendants, and in the absence of
testimony of negligence the Court could not have submitted the matter to the Jury. The sole and only grounds
of negligence upon which the Plaintiff attempted to rely
at the trial, and like"\\rise the only ground asserted on
appeal, is that the Defendant Ronald Tucker drove at
an excessi Ye rate of speed. There ":ras no direct testimony as to the speed of the automobile. Although there
\vere three passengers in the car in \Yhich the Defendant
Tucker \Vas driving, none of them \vere called to testify.
The witnesses at the scene of the accident did not describe
the movements of the car nor testify as to any speed of
the vehicle. The \vitnesses \vho \vere in the automobile
approaching from the opposite direction were not called
to testify, and, like\vise, the Police Officers, who investigated the accident and \vho wo"uld have been most likely
to have known of the existence of any brake marks left
by the Defendants' automobile, were not called as witnesses.
The sole argument advanced by Appellant as to
excessive speed on the part of the Defendant is that one
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or t\YO of the "'"itnesses heard the screech of brakes; that
the follO\\'"ing- day one of the neighbors \vent out, saw
some brake marks in the street, and proceeded to step
them off to the distance of 17 steps. The witness (Mr.
~IacFarland) admitted that he made no exact measurements, nor did he know the length of one of his steps,
but he estimated the distance to be approximately 50
feet. In the first place, "\Ve 'vish to point out, there is
no evidence to tie up the brake marks observed by the
\vitness the following· day with any brake marks left by
the Tucker automobile on the night of the accident.
Both the witnesses, Dorothy Wardleigh and William
Glen Norton, testified that they saw no brake marks
there on the night of the accident (Tr. 27, 36). Neither
of these witnesses testified that the automobile traveled
any distance after the impact, although they both apparently turned to see the car at about the time that
the impact occurred. It is apparent that the automobile
could not have been traveling at any considerable speed
at the moment of impact because the Norton child, who
was struck by the right front of the automobile, continued
to run around the car and into the house and was not
hurt (Tr. 26). There was no testimony as to how far
the car traveled after the moment of impact, nor as to
what speed it was traveling at the moment of impact
or at any time before.
With respect to the brake marks, Respondents objected to the \vitness MacFarland testifying as to his
measurements. Likewise objection \\'"as made to the tesSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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iiinony of Sgt. Bennett, who gave an opinion of the speed
of a vehicle based upon a purely hypothetical question.
rrhe objections were based on the grounds that it had
not been established that the marks were left by the
rrucker automobile, and further that the evidence with
respect to the speed of any vehicle whic~ might have
made such marks could not be calculated under the evidence of this ~ase. It is Respondents' position now that
the Court improperly overruled the objections and erred
in failing to strike the testimony after it was received.
However, even though the testimony 'vas there, the most
that can be argued from it by Appellant is that the automobile of the Defendant Tucker was traveling between
25 and 30 miles per hour. This is based upon the testimony of Sgt. Bennett to the effect that if the overall
length of the skid marks 'vas 50 feet (and we wish to
point out that the testimony as to that distance is very
Yague and indefinite), then it would be necessary to
subtract from that the 'vheel base of the vehicle in order
to determine the length of the skid marks for the front
and back wheels. Thus the distance would be reduced
from 50 to approximately 40 feet. Based upon 40 feet
of skid marks with a coefficient of friction of 65%, which
Sgt. Bennett testified could be possible in this case, the
speed of the vehicle 'vould have been somewhere between
25 and 30 miles per hour. Certainly such speed, under
all the facts and circumstances of this case, would not
justify the finding of negligence nor under any circumstances could it be held to be a proximate cause of the
accident.
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The testimony is undisputed by the Plaintiff herself
that she and her friend Karen were being chased by
Plaintiff's brother, and that they started to run out into
the street when they sa'v a car coming from the south
toward the north just about where Plaintiff ran out (Tr.
15). When Plaintiff saw this car, she turned to the left
and ran along the side of it next to the sidewalk and ran
out again from beliind that car and directly across the
street 'vithout stopping (Tr. 15, 16). At that time Plaintiff 'vas running as fast as she could to get away from
her brother (Tr. 16). It is further undisputed that at
the time it was dark and that the headlights on the automobiles were on. Thus as the Defendant Tucker proceeded south along Eccles Avenue and approaching the
automobile coming toward the north with its headlights
on, he was not· in any position to see the two small
children on the opposite side of the approaching automobile until after they had run out from behind that
car and directly into his path. Certainly it would have
been impossible for anyone traveling at any speed to
have stopped in sufficient time to have avoided the
collision.
And the fact, even if it be assumed to be the fact,
that Respondent Tucker was traveling between 25 and
30 miles per hour could not in any way be held to be
the proximate cause of the collision between the Tucker
automobile and the Plaintiff minor. There was no previous warning to the Defendant that the children were
playing in the street nor that anyone would be out on
the street at the time that he passed by. It was early
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Spring and snow was still on the ground (Tr. 13). As
far as the record shows, the Defendant had not traveled
in that direction at any time prior to the evening in
question and 'vas not in any way acquainted or familiar
with the area so as to know whether any children were
in the habit of playing around on the street at night. At
that time of the evening in that time of the year, it could
not be said that Defendant should have anticipated that
persons of any age would be out of the street reserved
for travel by motor vehicle. It was not at or near a
corner or intersection, but was down toward the middle
of the block where the accident occurred.
In this case, the Plaintiff had the burden of proof
to show Defendants to be negligent, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the accident and resulting injuries sustained. If this burden was not maintained, then the Court properly granted the motion for
a directed verdict. See Casereo vs. Hurst, (Ind. 1951),
99 N. E. 2d 440. As stated by the Supreme Court of
Michigan in the case of Colvaruso vs. Stroh Brewery
Company, 301 Mich. 245, 3 N. W. 2d 261, "The verdict
may not rest upon conjecture or a reconstruction of
events which have no evidentiary foundation.'' See also
Spackman vs. Benefit Assn. of Ry. Employees, 97 Ut. 91,
89 P. 2d 490.
In the case of Cederloff vs. Whited, 110 Ut. 45, 169
P. 2d 777, this Court determined that the Plaintiff driver
was not negligent proximately contributing to the accident who operated his automobile at a speed of 25 to
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30 miles per hour in a business zone on his proper side
of the street when approaching a vehicle proceeding in
the opposite direction and about to make a left turn
across the high\Yay in front of the Plaintiff's car.
In the case of Abrahams vs. Rice, 306 Mass. 24, 27
N. E. 2d 193, an appeal was taken to the Supreme Judicial
Court of }[assachusetts from an order of the Appellate
DiYision vacating a finding for the Plaintiff and entering
judgment for the Defendant. The Plaintiff in that case
\vas a school girl nearly eight years of age who left an
automobile bus and ran around in front of the bus across
the street, being struck by Defendant's automobile. In
affirming the judgment for the Defendant the Court
held:

''The mere happening of the accident was not
evidence that any negligence of the defendant had
a causal relation to its occurrence. Liability rests
solely upon negligence and the absence of the
latter makes impossible the existence of the former. There was no evidence that the speed at
which the defendant was operating her automobile
was unreasonable or improper, or that, in passing
the bus, which did not start until after the accident, the defendant was guilty of any breach of
duty that she .o"'\ved the plaintiff. We are unable
to find any evidence that would warrant a finding
that the defendant could see the plaintiff for more
than an instant before the accident or that, after
her presence in the street was discovered, the
defendant failed to act as a reasonably prudent
person in attempting to avert the accident. The
ruling that the evidence did not warrant a finding
that the defendant was negligent should have been
given by the trial judge.''
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See also Rose vs. Silveira, 318 Mass. 709, 63 N. E.
2d 895.
In both of the above mentioned cases, the evidence
as to speed is limited to the testimony of the Defendant
who testified he was traveling at a very slow rate. In
the case of Welch vs. Herman, 337 Ill. App. 322, 86 N. E.
2d 284, the Court was concerned with evidence of brake
marks, which, it was contended, was some evidence of
speed. Other witnesses who testified indicated speed of
less than 35 miles per hour. The Court held that, from
the evidence, the only verdict which the Jury was justified in finding was for the Defendant, stating:
''None of the testimony set out above indicates
what the speed of the Appellee's car was at the
time of or just prior to the time of the accident.
Mr. Schaefer's testimony does indicate that at
sometime the Appellee was going more than 20
miles per hour; even assuming this to be true,
this testimony in and of itself does not establish
negligent conduct proximately or directly causing
the accident in question. Nor has the Appellant
introduced into this case any ordinance or statute
which was violated by Appellee's conduct. Taking
all of the evidence into consideration, the jury had
no choice but to find for the Appellee.''
In the case of Klink vs. Bany, 207 Ia. 1241, 224 N. W.
540, the Plaintiff, age seven, alighted from an automobile
stopped on the right hand side of the road, ran around
behind the back of the car and across the road in front
of an automobile approaching from the opposite direction. In reversing a judgment for the Plaintiff and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14

directing that a judgment for the Defendant be entered,
the Court said :
"It is a defined and well-settled rule of law in
this state that a driYer of a motor vehicle is not
legally bound 'to anticipate or know the intentions
or purpose' of a person, 'vho being in a zone of
safety immediately prior to a collision with said
vehicle, suddenly and without warning enters a
zone of danger, resulting in an injury to said person by reason of a collision with the vehicle. . . .
The only legal conclusion that can be drawn from
the case on both the law and the fact side is that
it 'vas a case of inevitable accident, and therefore
the theory of nonliability a.pplied. . . . The defendant was under no obligation to give a warning signal. There is no evidence that the defendant was not driving his car in a careful and prudent manner, or that he did not have his car under
control as he approached the part of the highway
where the plaintiff suddenly dashed out from behind another car, thereby coming in contact with
the defendant's car.... We view this case as one
of inevitable accident. The defendant's motion
for a directed verdict and for a new trial should
have been sustained.''
In Crutchley vs. Bruce, 214 Ia. 731, 240 N. W. 238,
decedent was eight years of age when he was killed by
Defendant's 'vestbound automobile when he emerged
from behind a milk truck. The boy had ridden on the
milk truck for a short distance and when it stopped
opposite the entrance to his home he alighted and ran
around behind it to the rear of a truck proceeding in
the same direction and then out into the street directly
in front of the Defendant's westbound automobile going
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45 to 50 miles an hour approaching the parked milk
truck. In reversing a judgment for the Plaintiff, the
Court held that Defendant's speed was not causally related to the accident and stated:
' 'It cannot be said that a person of ordinary
and reasonable care and prudence is guilty of
negligence in not anticipating that from behind
every standing vehicle he may pass on the highway some pedestrian may suddenly dash into the
pathway of his car, and that he is guilty of negligence in not giving a signal of his presence in
passing every such standing vehicle. . . . As we
have seen, the speed of the automobile was not
the proximate cause of the injury to intestate, nor
"\vas the [defendant], under the facts shown in the
record, guilty of negligence in not sounding his
horn ... when about to pass the milk truck."
In Watson 1)8. Home Mutual Insurance, 215 Ia. 670,
246 N. W. 255, Plaintiff was ten years of age and was
retrieving foul balls outside a ball park. As he was
picking up a ball in the ditch on the opposite side of the
road he saw an approaching vehicle "some distance to
the east''. Upon getting the ball he climbed up to the
level of the road and started running toward the ball
park without looking further to the east. He ran between
two parked automobiles and as he came out into the
driving lane ran 10 or 11 feet before he was struck by
the approaching truck just beyond the center of the
roadway. The truck was going about 30 miles per hour.
The Supreme Court affirmed a directed verdict stating:
"The only opportunity that (he) had to observe the boy and to take any precaution for his
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safety 'vas that period of time which transpired
'vhile the boy 'vas running a distance of eleven
feet. This is the equivalent of saying that he had
no opportunity at all.''
The above case is very similar to the case now before
the Court, except for the fact that the accident there
occurred in the day time "\vhile in the instant matter the
accident occurred at night.
In Rodriguez vs. Abadie, (La. App.), 168 So. 515, the
Plaintiff's daughter was 12 years of age and darted into
the street from behind a parked vehicle at the curb. The
vehicle was traveling about 25 miles per hour. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's determination
of no cause of action not only upon the ground that the
"proximate, direct cause of the accident was the act of
the plaintiff's child in darting, from behind a parked
automobile, into the open roadway'', but also on the
ground that defendant was without fault.
See also, Conte vs. Mizzoni, (Mass.), 11 N. E. 2d 496;
Preger vs. Gomory, (Fla.), 52 So. 2d 541; Boyd vs.
Brown, 192 V a. 702, 66 S. E. 2d 559; Joplin vs. Fra.nz,
(Miss. App. 1952), 240 s·. W. 2d 209.
II
PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUrrORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW.
While we agree with the statement made by Appellant that a person of tender years is generally assumed
''not to have the same consciousness of danger and the
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same judgment in avoiding it as an adult,'' nevertheless,
such children are required to exercise that degree of
care which a reasonably prudent person of similar age
and discretion would exercise under the same or similar
circumstances. And where the evidence clearly establishes, as it does in the present case, that a minor child
is conscious of a dangerous condition and fails to exercise reasonable care for her own safety, she should not
be entitled to recover. Plaintiff Angela Alvarado testified that she knew she should not play in the street; that
she had been so instructed by both her mother and her
teachers ; that when she first turned out to start over
into the street there was a car going north on Eccles
Avenue which just about ran over her. She then ran
along the side of the car next to the sidewalk and out
from behind the moving car and across the street again
without looking to see if any cars were coming from the
other direction (Tr. 15, 16). She testified further that
she knew when children run across the street in front
of automobiles there is danger, and that she didn't know
why she ran out behind the one car and across the street
without looking for the other automobile; that since the
accident she has not played out in the street (Tr. ·18).
Mrs. Alvarado testified that she had always told Angela
to stay out of the street; that her daughter was a sensible
girl and knew the dangers of playing in the street (Tr.
75). She further testified that she knew her children
liked to play out in the street because the neighbor
children did it and that V\ras the reason she had previously
told her not to play out on the street (Tr. 76). Mrs.
Alvarado also stated that she customarily let Angela go
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out to play after dark until 8:00 o'clock and that on the
night in question she did not expect her to go into the
street but thought she would play in front of her girl
friend's house (Tr. 75, 76).
vVhile the diagram prepared on the blackboard during the trial was not offered in evidence, the Court Reporter has attempted to make a reproduction of it in the
Transcript of Testimony (Tr. 47). This diagram would
indicate that the accident happened approximately 3,4 of
the way between 22nd and 23rd Streets, so that it was
not at any point near a cross,valk or other designated
place where pedestrians are permitted to cross the street.
Our Supreme Court has previously determined that a
person attempting to cross a street who either fails to
look, or having looked fails to see what he should see, is
contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Mingus vs.
Olsson, 114 Utah 505, 201 P. 2d 495; Cox vs. Thompson,
(1953), 254 P. 2d 1047.
While the above cases refer to adult pedestrians,
nevertheless, the same principal of law would be applicable to a minor child who is sufficiently old enough to
understand and capable of comprehending danger, such
as was involved in the instant case, and who failed to
exercise any care or take any precaution to avoid injury.
Thus in the case of Gt·aham vs. Johnson, 109 Utah 345,
166 P. 2d 230, the Court held that a thirteen year old
Plaintiff was guilty of negligence while playing in the
street (although liabiilty was imposed upon the Defendant on the doctrine of last clear chance).
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In the case of Bird vs. Meade, 281 Mich. 114, 274 N.
W. 730, a t"relve year old girl was held to have been
contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Decedent
and her girl friend crossed the highway in front of the
school to procure apples from a wagon facing east on
the south side of the highway. After obtaining the
apples, they ran around to the rear of the wagon and
darted across the highway to return to the school house
when decedent was struck by an automobile coming from
the east and passing the wagon where the girls had
obtained the apples. The Court stated that it appeared
under the circumstances that neither of the girls saw
the approaching car in their attempt to return to the
school house, and commented:
''The evidence shows that the decedent was ...
in the eighth grade, was considered by her teacher
an excellent student, had been warned of the
dangers of traffic on (this highway) even as late
as the morning of the accident, and had sufficient
intelligence to appreciate the danger of running
across the road without stopping and looking for
oncoming cars. The above facts clearly establish
contributory negligence.''
In the case of Volkman.n vs. Fidelity and Guaranty
Company of New York, 252 Wis. 464, 32 N. W. 2d 348,
the Court, in discussing contributory negligence of a
Plaintiff minor held:
''Appellant boy was seven years, 4 months, 18
days old at the time of the accident. As was stated
in the former opinion, he was bright, well-trained,
and knew the dangers of crossing busy streets
between intersections. A boy of his age, training,
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and Pxperience "~ho blindly runs into a city street
at n point other than at an intersection without
looking "~here he is traveling and being in no
position to yield the right-of-way to oncoming
traffic, is guilty of causal negligence as a matter
of law' as held by the trial court."
In the case of Thomas vs. Siegman, 301 Ill. App. 627,
22 N. E. 2d 476, the Court in a memorandum decision
affirmed a directed verdict for the Defendant on the
ground of contributory negligence on the part of the
Plaintiff minor child. The syllabus to the opinion maintains the following:
''A physically normal 12-year-old boy, who
heedlessly left the street curb in front of his home
on a dark, foggy night and ran across the street
in the middle of the block and into the path of
defendant's automobile, which was approaching
at a speed of between 30 and 35 miles per hour
and "rhich was burning lights observable through
fog for more than 100 feet, was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law precluding
his recovery from defendant for injuries received
when the boy was hit by defendant's automobile.''
See also Busby vs. Levy, 101 N. Y. S. 2d 946; Duval vs.
Palmer, 113 Vt. 389, 34 A. 2d 317; Fontinot vs. Freuden-stein, (La. App.), 119 So. 677; Gauthier vs. Foote, (La.
App.), 19 So. 2d 9.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion Respondents respectfully submit to
the Court that the accident in this ease was proximately
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ing out from behind a moving vehicle directly in the
path of Respondents' automobile coming from the opposite direction at a time when the latter was unable to
observe the Plaintiff child in sufficient time to avoid a
collision. rrhe most favorable position which might be
taken for the Plaintiff would be that the accident was
unavoidable. Certainly it was unavoidable on the part
of the Respondent Ronald Tucker who had no opportunity to stop or otherwise turn out before the impact
and who, as a matter of law, was free from negligence.
Respectfully submitted,
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN
NIELSEN & CONDER
Attorneys for Respondents

510 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah .
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